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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
v. : 
JOHN ANGELO GARCIA, : Case No. 20060328-CA 
Defendant/Appellee. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)Q) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. Whether the record adequately supports standing where it is undisputed that 
John Garcia lived in the upstairs apartment at issue, and was the sole occupant of the 
bedroom connected to the balcony with the duffel bag. 
Standard of Review: The question of whether a person has standing to request 
relief "is primarily a question of law, although there may be factual findings that bear on 
the issue. We will review such factual determinations made by a trial court with 
deference." Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373-74 (Utah 1997). 
Under established law, a defendant has standing to challenge the search of items in his 
residence. See Alderman v. U.S., 394 U.S. 165, 176-77 (1969); State v. Caver, 814 P.2d 
604, 610 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 80-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
B. Whether the state is barred from raising unpreserved issues on appeal, where it 
has not claimed plain error or exceptional circumstances. 
Standard of Review: This Court will not review unpreserved issues unless the 
appellant has established plain error or exceptional circumstances. See State v. Montieh 
2004 UT App 242, ^ [10, 95 P.3d 1216 (citing State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996). cert, denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997)), affd, 2005 UT 48, 122 P.3d 571. 
-JUILES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provision is relevant to the issues on appeal and set forth at 
Addendum A: U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below 
In October 2005, the state filed an (amended) information against John Garcia and 
his brother, Jeremiah, for two counts of drug possession, two counts of child endanger-
ment, and one count of possessing paraphernalia. (R. 1-4, 46-49). After a preliminary 
hearing (R. 108), the court bound John over to stand trial on the charges. (R. 38-39). 
The defense then filed a motion to suppress. (R. 61-63). It challenged a 
warrantless search conducted by officers prior to obtaining a search warrant. It argued 
that "[ojfficers conducted an illegal search of Mr. Garcia's property11 (R. 63), and it 
emphasized officers' search of a duffel bag. (R. 61-63). Thereafter, the state opposed the 
motion. Notably, it did not present argument about the legality or illegality of the initial 
search conducted by officers without a warrant. (See R. 64-69). 
The state focused primarily on the fact that a magistrate judge signed a search 
warrant, and officers executed it to collect items in the apartment. (See specifically, R. 
67-68 (focusing on the warrant and claiming that evidence was seized after the warrant 
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was issued)). The state also maintained that John Garcia lacked standing to challenge a 
warrantless search of the duffel bag. (R. 65-67). 
In connection with defendant's motion, the trial court conducted an evidentiary 
hearing (see R. 107), where defense counsel specified that the challenge related to 
officers' search of the premises before obtaining a warrant. (R. 107:13-14). The state did 
not question the scope or nature of defendant's challenge. (R. 107:14-15). Likewise, it 
did not defend the officers' initial warrantless search of the premises. (R. 64-69; 107:14-
15). Instead, it argued that the subsequently issued warrant governed. (Id.) 
After argument, the court took the matter under advisement. It granted the motion 
to suppress, and it entered findings, conclusions, and an order. (See R. 79-80; 88-92; see 
also Addendum B to State's Brief of Appellant). The state moved to dismiss the case and 
then appealed. (R. 81-82, 93-94). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Two officers testified at hearings in this case. Detective Smith testified at the 
preliminary hearing. He stated that he arrived at a second floor apartment at 1703 South 
700 East to perform interviews and to help with narcotics. (R. 108:5, 14). During a 
search of the apartment, he observed "a little bit" of marijuana scattered in areas around 
the living room, including on the T.V. and stereo, and on a chair. (R. 108:5). Also, he 
saw "residue" in the kitchen on the countertops by food and on the floor, and he saw 
marijuana in the hallway. (Id.) 
Detective Smith testified there were two bedrooms in the apartment. (R. 108:5). 
When the prosecutor asked if he knew who stayed in the bedrooms (R. 108:5), Detective 
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Smith testified that John Garcia stayed in the north bedroom (R. 108:5-6), and his 
brother, Jeremiah, stayed in the other bedroom with his girlfriend, a mother, and a small 
child. (R. 108:6; see also R. 108:10, where Smith testified that the mother, Alma, was 
visiting the apartment). Smith testified that in the second bedroom, where the child slept, 
he observed a box under the bed containing several grams of mushrooms. (R. 108:6). He 
also observed marijuana residue on the bed, and bags in the closet containing four pounds 
of marijuana. (R. 108:6-7). 
In "the defendant's bedroom," Smith observed marijuana "shake" or residue 
throughout, and a "big Tupperware thing of marijuana inside it." (R. 108:7). Smith 
described a balcony on the upper level apartment that could be accessed only from John's 
bedroom. (R. 108:7). He testified that he observed a solid black, nylon duffel bag on the 
balcony "full of several pounds of marijuana" and "one or two bags of mushrooms." (R. 
108:7). When he observed the bag, it was unzipped. (R. 108:15). 
Smith described paraphernalia that he located inside the apartment, including 
pipes, glassware, and a magazine. (R. 108:12). According to Smith, John 
"spontaneously uttered" that the marijuana was his (R. 108:10), and he described how he 
packaged and distributed marijuana to others. (R. 108:11). 
Smith testified that he believed there was a dispatch of a robbery in progress in the 
area, and the dispatch initially led officers to the apartment. (R. 108:13). He did not 
speak with any officer who was originally dispatched to the apartment (R. 108:13 ("I 
didn't speak with those officers"; also stating he arrived "way late after the fact")). Smith 
was there to process narcotics and to speak with the defendant. Also, he spoke to - but 
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did not identify - the male, who purportedly "tried to commit the robbery." (R. 108:14). 
Smith testified that when he arrived, the apartment was being secured, and a 
warrant was being drafted or obtained. (R. 108:14). Also, he was already aware of the 
marijuana discovered in the duffel bag in the apartment. (R. 108:15). Smith did not 
know how officers came to find the marijuana in the bag. (R. 108:14-15). It was his 
understanding that no one from the police force touched or unzipped the bag. (R. 
108:15). He could not explain how he knew that (see R. 108:16), particularly since he 
did not talk to any of the original officers in the matter (R. 108:13) and he did not know 
how they came to discover the contents of the bag. (R. 108:14-15). 
Smith acknowledged that his understanding of the bag being unzipped was in 
conflict with a report from one of the original officers on the scene. (R. 108:17). A 
report from Officer Honeywell supported that "the officers actually opened the duffel 
bag." (R. 108:17; see also R. 65, where the prosecutor acknowledged that "one of the 
officers opened the duffel bag and saw it contained a large amount of marijuana"). 
Finally, Smith testified that the "search warrant was written partially because of 
the marijuana in the duffel bag." (R. 108:15). 
At a second hearing, the state presented evidence from Detective Teerlink about 
"obtaining [] a search warrant." (See R. 107:7). Teerlink testified that he received 
information from an officer on the scene, who had responded to a call for a burglary in 
progress. (R. 107:8). The defense objected to the evidence and the trial court sustained 
the objection. (R. 107:8-9). Teerlink then testified that he received information from 
officers that he included in the affidavit for the warrant. (R. 107:9). 
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He stated that officers reported observing a male carry a duffel bag, and when 
officers "challenged" the male, he ran back into the apartment. (R. 107:9). The defense 
again objected to the hearsay evidence. (R. 107:9). The trial court sustained the objection 
and indicated that the parties were "here today" to determine if the officer had personal 
knowledge of the search that occurred prior to obtaining the wan-ant. (See R. 107:10); 
see also McVickers v. State, 838 S.W.2d 651, 656 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (stating hearsay 
is allowed in suppression hearings and to support a warrant; however, to assess whether a 
government agent had sufficient information to justify a warrantless intrusion, "an officer 
may not testify to the reasons another officer gave for" the conduct; also, recognizing that 
the officer who intruded must identify "specific, articulable facts" in light of his "experi-
ence and knowledge" to justify the intrusion) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). 
The state has not challenged on appeal the trial court's ruling in sustaining the 
objection to Teerlink's testimony. (See State's Brief of Appellant, 1). Instead, it claims in 
a footnote that the hearsay should have been admitted under Rules 104(a) and 1101(b)(1), 
Utah Rules of Evidence. (Id. at 6 n. 3). Its assertion consists of two sentences and 
citations. (Id.) That does not constitute relevant analysis. See Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 
UT 55, Tf25, -- P.3d ~, 2006 WL 2709210 (declining to consider petitioner's argument 
raised in a footnote and "consisting of two conclusory sentences"; "[s]uch briefing is 
inadequate"). 
Teerlink went on to testify that he prepared an affidavit, and he presented it 
together with a proposed warrant to a magistrate judge. (R. 107:10). Teerlink testified 
that the judge signed the warrant, and officers searched the residence. (R. 107:11). On 
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cross-examination, Teerlink admitted that prior to seeking a search warrant, officers had 
already conducted a search of the residence. He maintained they conducted Ma protective 
sweep" and they looked inside the duffel bag. (R. 107:11-12). 
Although the defendant's motion to suppress specifically challenged a warrantless 
search (see R. 61-63; 107:12-14), the state presented no evidence and no argument on the 
matter. (See R. 107); see also State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d408, 411-12 (Utah 1984) 
(holding the state bears the burden of proof to justify warrantless conduct; also, where the 
state presented no evidence on the matter, it failed in its burden of proof). The trial court 
granted the motion to suppress. (R. 90-92). The trial court's ruling should be affirmed. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In trial court proceedings, John Garcia challenged a warrantless search of items in 
his apartment. In response, the state challenged Garcia's standing. The state also 
acknowledged in the proceedings that John lived in the apartment in issue. Thus, under 
Utah law, where John lived in the apartment, he had standing to challenge the warrantless 
search of the premises and of items discovered in the apartment. 
Next, in trial court proceedings, the state presented no evidence to justify the 
warrantless search of items in the apartment. Thus, it failed in its burden of proof. See 
Christensen, 676 P.2d at 411-12 (ruling that "[sjince the officers had no warrant, it was 
the burden of the State to show that the search was lawful"; also since the state presented 
no evidence regarding the warrantless search, the discovered items would be suppressed). 
On appeal, the state has raised new arguments under the Fourth Amendment for 
the search. The arguments were not preserved below, and the state has not raised them 
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under the plain-error or the exceptional-circumstances doctrine. This Court should reject 
the new arguments, and affirm the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE RECORD ADEQUATELY SUPPORTS STANDING. 
A. THE RECORD SUPPORTS JOHN GARCIA'S STANDING UNDER THE 
LAW AS IT RELATES TO THE DUFFEL BAG. 
A person has standing to challenge a search under the Fourth Amendment if he has 
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place. See State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 
80 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
The issue of standing "involves two inquiries: first, whether the proponent of a 
particular legal right has alleged 'injury in fact/ and, second, whether the proponent is 
asserting his own legal rights and interests rather than basing his claim for relief upon the 
rights of third parties.'1 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978) (cites omitted); see 
also idL at 140 (stating the inquiry asks if the challenged search "violated the Fourth 
Amendment rights of a criminal defendant who seeks to exclude the evidence" obtained 
during the search). 
For a person who has been charged with a crime as a result of a search, his 
standing to challenge the search may arise under concepts identified in "real or personal 
property law" or concepts "recognized and permitted by society."' U.S. v. Gordon, 168 
F.3d 1222, 1225-26 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143-44), cert, denied, 
527 U.S. 1030 (1999); see also Webb, 790 P.2d at 80 (stating the inquiry asks whether 
the defendant has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy, and whether his expectation 
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is recognized by society as reasonable). 
Both property law and society recognize that a person has a legitimate and 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the place where he lives. See Chapman v. U.S., 365 
U.S. 610 (1961) (recognizing an expectation of privacy for the tenant living in rented 
premises); U.S. v. Vega, 221 F.3d 789, 795 (5th Cir. 2000) ("As lessee of the residence, 
[defendant's] expectation of privacy was reasonable inasmuch as it had !a source outside 
of the Fourth Amendment... by reference to [both] concepts of real property . . . law' 
and 'understandings that are recognized and permitted by society'") (cite omitted), cert, 
denied, 531 U.S. 1155 (2001); see also Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142 (recognizing that "a 
person can have a legally sufficient interest in a place other than his own home"); State v. 
Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 566 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (stating courts "have recognized a 
legitimate expectation of privacy where a defendant resided at the searched premises as a 
co-tenant"; also, courts have recognized "a legitimate expectation of privacy where there 
is evidence that a defendant routinely used [lodging] with the permission of the owner 
and had been given a key or some regular means of access"), abrogated on other grounds 
as recognized in State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997). 
Indeed, a person's expectation of privacy in his dwelling is "presumptive." See 
U.S. v. Cardoza-Hinojosa, 140 F.3d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that Fourth 
Amendment protections are "presumptively applicable" to a person's living premises and 
to commercial premises he uses) (emphasis added), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 973 (1998). 
Also, a person's dwelling includes areas around the home "to which the activity of 
home life extends." Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170, 182 n.12 (1984). For an apartment, that 
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includes the apartment itself, and areas where the tenant has exclusive control. See e.g. 
Com, v. Thomas. 267 N.E.2d 489, 491 (Mass. 1971). 
The law further recognizes that a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
items searched in the apartment where he lives. That is, if the record supports that 
officers searched a defendant's residence, the defendant has standing to challenge a 
search of items in the residence. He is not required to show a separate ownership interest 
in items for standing. See e.g., U.S. v. Isaacs, 708 F.2d 1365, 1367-68 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(ruling that resident had standing to challenge a search into a safe where journals were 
found, even though he disclaimed any interest in the journals), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 852 
(1983); U.S. v. Perez, 700 F.2d 1232, 1236 (8th Cir. 1983) (ruling that a resident had 
standing to challenge the search in his home of a guest's luggage). 
According to the United States Supreme Court, 
If the police make an unwarranted search of a house and seize tangible property 
belonging to third parties - even a transcript of a third-party conversation - the 
homeowner may object to its use against him, not because he had any interest in 
the seized items as "effects" protected by the Fourth Amendment, but because they 
were the fruits of an unauthorized search of his house, which is itself expressly 
protected by the Fourth Amendment. Nothing seen or found on the premises may 
legally form the basis for an arrest or search warrant or for testimony at the 
homeowner's trial, since the prosecution would be using the fruits of a Fourth 
Amendment violation. 
Alderman v. U.S., 394 U.S. 165, 176-77 (1969) (note omitted; emphasis added). 
In State v. Cayer, 814 P.2d 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), the state maintained that 
defendant lacked standing to challenge the search and seizure of items found in a trailer 
that defendant occupied with three other defendants. The items included "a blood-stained 
box, a wrench, hip boots, tennis shoes, a puma bag, a pink bag, a knife, and a shirt." Id. 
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at 610. Defendant Cayer claimed "no possessory or privacy interest in any of the items 
seized." Id. Notwithstanding, he maintained that his standing to challenge the search of 
the trailer extended to items in the trailer. 
This Court agreed. It stated the following: 
Defendant did, however, have a possessory interest in the trailer itself because he 
lived there, and therefore he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area 
where the items were seized. Moreover, the small trailer constituted the entire 
living quarters of the four defendants. We conclude, therefore, that defendant did 
have standing to challenge the warrantless seizure. 
Id at 610. 
In State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, defendant Charles Webb challenged the 
warrantless search of an apartment and items in the apartment, including a jewelry box 
and pursue. See id. at 70, 79-80. Webb and his girlfriend lived in the apartment. Id. at 
80. The jewelry box and purse belonged to her. See id at 70, 79. Officers searched the 
purse incident to the girlfriend's arrest, id at 70, and they searched the jewelry box later 
during a search of the apartment. See id. In considering Webb's standing to challenge 
the search of the items, this Court stated: 
Factors relevant to [the standing] inquiry include whether the defendant had any 
possessory or proprietary interest in the place searched or the item seized in the 
challenged search; was legitimately on the premises; had the right to exclude 
others from that place; exhibited a subjective expectation that the place would 
remain free from governmental invasion; or took normal precautions to maintain 
his privacy. 
Id. at 80 (cites omitted). This Court determined that Webb had standing to challenge the 
search of the apartment and jewelry box. Id at 80-81. Even though the jewelry box be-
longed to Webb's girlfriend, it was searched in connection with a governmental intrusion 
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that went into places where Webb had an expectation of privacy. See id. (citing Alder-
man, 394 U.S. at 176-77, for the proposition that a resident has standing to challenge a 
warrantless search of his premises where items belonging to a third party are seized). 
However, Webb had no expectation of privacy in the purse. Webb, 790 P.2d at 
83. !f[T]he search of the purse in conjunction with [and incident to the girlfriend's] arrest 
preceded the independently challenged search of the apartment," and was, therefore, 
separate from the apartment search. Id at 81. Thus, Webb lacked standing in the purse. 
Id at 83. 
In this case, the record supported John Garcia's standing to challenge the search of 
areas and items in the apartment where he lived, including a duffel bag that was found on 
a balcony accessible only from his bedroom. (R. 108:5-6, 7). Specifically, the state 
acknowledged in trial court proceedings that John Garcia lived at the apartment in issue. 
(See e.g., R. 3-4 (stating John Garcia resides at 1703 South 700 East, apartment C)). 
In addition, the evidence supported his residency. "Detective Lyman Smith 
testified that he interviewed defendant following his arrest and that defendant stated that 
he rented a room at the apartment." (State's Brief of Appellant, 10; R. 108:5-6, 7 ). 
"Defendant also said he was 'staying in the north bedroom.1" (State's Brief of Appellant, 
10; R. 108:5-6, 7). That is sufficient to support John Garcia's standing with respect to the 
apartment and the bedroom connected to the balcony where the duffel bag was found. 
See e.g. Webb, 790 P.2d at 80 (considering the defendant's subjective expectation). 
"What an officer knew or believed is part of our legitimate expectation of privacy 
analysis only when a defendant has asserted to that officer a permissive or possessory 
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interest in the object searched." State v. Kolster, 869 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(cites omitted). 
Where John admitted to officers that he lived in the apartment (R. 108:5-6), and 
where the state represented in proceedings that John lived in the apartment (R. 3-4), John 
had a possessory/proprietary interest in the place, he was legitimately at the apartment, 
and he had a legitimate expectation of privacy there. See Webb, 790 P.2d at 80-81. 
Inasmuch as John had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched, he 
also had a legitimate expectation of privacy in items searched on the premises, including 
the duffel bag. See id at 81 (stating that a defendant, who has a privacy interest "in the 
place searched" "is not deprived of fourth amendment standing" to assert a challenge to 
items searched and seized, even if "another person actually owns" the items). 
In addition, where John did not disavow any interest in the duffel bag, that 
supports his standing. (See Record, generally); see also State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 
464 (Utah 1990) ("Where a defendant has not declared beforehand that he has no 
interest" in the property, "defendant has standing to challenge the legality of the search"). 
In this case, nothing more was necessary to support standing. Where the state 
maintained that John lived in the upstairs apartment (see R. 3-4; 108:5-6; 90, f 1), and he 
occupied the north bedroom providing the only access to the balcony where the duffel 
bag was found (R. 108:5-6, 7); Kolster, 869 P.2d at 995; and where John did not disavow 
an interest in the duffel bag (see e.g. R. 108:10); Larocco, 794 P.2d at 464, the record 
sufficiently supported his standing to challenge the warrantless search of the apartment 
and items located therein, including the duffel bag. See Alderman, 394 U.S. at 176-77; 
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Caver, 814 P.2d at 610; Webb, 790 P.2d at 80-81; see also Isaacs, 708 F.2d at 1367-68. 
B. THE STATE CLAIMS ON APPEAL THAT JOHN GARCIA DID NOT 
OFFER EVIDENCE THAT HE LIVED AT THE APARTMENT. GARCIA 
WAS NOT REQUIRED TO PRESENT SUCH EVIDENCE, SINCE THE STATE 
DID NOT DISPUTE HIS STANDING IN THE TRIAL COURT WITH 
RESPECT TO THE APARTMENT. 
The state faults John Garcia for failing to present evidence to support that he lived 
at the apartment. (See Brief of Appellant, 10). The state's argument is misplaced. In this 
case, the prosecutor did not raise the issue of standing as it related to the apartment (see 
R. 65-67; 107:7, 14-15). 
Indeed, as stated supra, Point LA., herein, state witnesses and agents affirmatively 
maintained for purposes of the proceedings here that John lived at 1703 South 700 East, 
apartment C. (R. 1-4; see also R. 108:5-6). Thus, the trial court was justified in relying on 
that undisputed fact in its ruling. (See R. 90, f 1); see also Kolster, 869 P.2d at 995 
(stating that what an officer knew or believed is relevant to the analysis in determining 
defendant's legitimate expectation of privacy, specifically when the defendant has 
asserted to the officer that he has a possessory interest in the area searched); Larocco, 794 
P.2d at 464 (ruling that if a defendant "has not declared beforehand that he has no 
interest" in the property, he has standing to challenge the legality of the search); Cardoza-
Hinojosa, 140 F.3d at 613 (recognizing that Fourth Amendment protections are 
"presumptively applicable" where the individual lives); Cayer, 814 P.2d at 610 
(recognizing that a co-tenant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the search of the 
trailer and of items located in connection therewith, even where he did not claim that the 
items belonged to him); Webb, 790 P.2d at 80-81; Isaacs, 708 F.2d at 1367-68. 
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The record adequately supports John's interest in the premises. See supra, pp. 12-
13, herein. He was not required to present any additional information on the matter. 
In addition, the state is barred from arguing for the first time on appeal that John 
Garcia lacked standing for the apartment. Utah appellate courts will not consider a 
standing issue raised first on appeal. See State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1138-39 
(Utah 1989) (stating that a claim of error cannot be raised for the first time on appeal); 
State v. Rodriguez, 841 P.2d 1228, 1229 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (stating that the court in 
Schlosser "held that Fourth Amendment standing is a substantive issue, not a 
jurisdictional issue. It is therefore waived by the state if not raised at trial"); State v. 
Marshall 791 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (stating that "the Schlosser standing 
rule was fashioned to protect the defendant from being required to deal with new legal 
issues on appeal when he had no warning of the necessity to develop the relevant facts 
below"), overruled on other grounds as recognized in State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, 37 
P.3d 1073; see also U.S. v. 22249 Dolorosa Street 167 F.3d 509, 512 (9th Cir. 1999) 
("Having failed to raise it below, the government has waived the Fourth Amendment 
standing issue"); U.S. v. Gonzales, 79 F.3d 413, 419 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the 
government waived its standing argument when it was put on notice that the defendant 
would claim a privacy interest), cert, denied, 519 U.S. 869 (1996). Thus, this Court 
should reject the state's standing argument raised for the first time on appeal as it relates 
to the apartment. 
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POINT II. THE STATE DOES NOT DISPUTE THAT THE INITIAL, 
WARRANTLESS SEARCH WAS UNLAWFUL. THAT SHOULD END 
THE ANALYSIS. THE STATED REMAINING ARGUMENTS WERE 
NOT PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable governmental 
intrusions in their home. See U.S. Const, amend. IV; Utah Const, art. I, § 14. A 
warrantless search is a per se unreasonable intrusion, unless it is justified by one of the 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions articulated by the Supreme Court. 
See Katz v. U.S.. 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
In this case, the record is undisputed that officers engaged in a warrantless search 
and found illegal substances. Detective Smith arrived at the apartment while an affidavit 
for a warrant was being drafted. (R. 108:14). It had not yet been presented to a judge. 
(See id.) Notwithstanding, Detective Smith said that at that time, officers were already 
aware of the existence of marijuana in a duffel bag in the apartment. (R. 108:14). Smith 
did not know how the officers discovered the drugs. (R. 108:14-15). He did not speak 
with any of the original officers on the scene. (R. 108:13). He acknowledged to the 
defense, however, that according to police reports, the initial officers on the scene opened 
the duffel bag during a warrantless search. (See R. 108:17). 
Smith understood that once officers discovered the illegal substances "they 
detained everybody, and they called Detective Teerlink" (R. 108:16) to draft an affidavit 
for a search warrant based on items found during the warrantless search. (R. 108:15 
(stating the search warrant was based partially on items discovered in the duffel bag)). 
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Detective Teerlink testified that before he was called to the residence to prepare 
the affidavit, officers had already been inside the apartment and they had conducted a 
search. (R. 107:11). He claimed "they" conducted a "protective sweep" (R. 107:11) and 
searched inside the duffel bag. (R. 107:12)/ 
Teerlink described information that he included in an affidavit for a search 
warrant. (R. 107:9 (stating that he put what he was told by others)). He ultimately 
presented the affidavit together with a warrant to a magistrate. (See R. 107:10 (State's 
1
 "A 'protective sweep' is a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an 
arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others." Maryland v. Buie, 
494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990). To justify a "protective sweep", the officer who conducted the 
sweep must have a "'reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts'" that '"the 
area swept harbored an individual posing a danger to the officer or others.'" State v. 
Grossi, 2003 UT App 181, Tfl6, 72 P.3d 686 (quoting Bine), cert, denied, 78 P.3d 987 
(Utah 2003). Also, the sweep must be incident to an arrest. Buie, 494 U.S. at 327. 
The Buie doctrine does not allow officers to use the protective sweep to conduct a 
full-on search or to look inside boxes or duffel bags. See e.g. U.S. v. Noushfar, 78 F.3d 
1442, 1448 (9th Cir. 1996) (ruling that officers violated the Buie doctrine when they 
examined the contents of abox); U.S. v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146, 151 (10th Cir. 1986) 
(ruling that officers violated Buie when they failed to conduct a quick and cursory check 
of the premises). 
In addition, if officers secure suspects outside the premises (see e.g. R. 64-65 
(reflecting the prosecutor's belief here that officers secured males outside the premises)), 
they may not be justified in relying on the Buie doctrine to enter the premises and to 
conduct a search. See e.g. U.S. v. Chaves, 169 F.3d 687, 691-92 (11th Cir. 1999) (ruling 
that officers could not rely on Buie, where they arrested two men outside, and then went 
into a warehouse for a warrantless search); State v. Olson, 55 P.3d 935, 940 (Mont. 
2002); State v. Kruse, 499 N.W.2d 185, 188 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (ruling that "the 
bedroom closet was not in the vicinity of the place of arrest and therefore not subject to a 
Buie protective search without reasonable suspicion"). 
Although Detective Teerlink testified that officers conducted a protective sweep 
and searched in the duffel bag, the state presented no evidence to support a "reasonable 
belief based on specific and articulable facts" that such a sweep was justified, Grossi, 
2003 UT App 181, ^ [16 (identifying standard), among other things, and no argument or 
analysis on the matter. (See R. 64-69; 107:14-15; see also State's Brief of Appellant 
(presenting no argument on the matter)). 
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Exhibits 1 and 2)). The magistrate judge signed the warrant and officers then issued the 
warrant and searched the residence. (R. 107:11). The prosecutor offered the affidavit 
and warrant in evidence to show that they were the documents that Teerlink wrote for 
"the listed residence." (R. 107:10). 
Based on the officers' initial warrantless search "of Mr. Garcia's property" (R. 63), 
the defense moved to suppress all evidence discovered in the matter. (R. 62, 63). The 
defense argued that the warrant was "based on the fruit of the poisonous tree. That is, a 
search was conducted prior to [Teerlink's] involvement, prior to the issuance of the 
search warrant, that involved [an] illegal search of [John Garcia's] residence, or the 
contents thereof, and that based on that illegal search a warrant was issued." (R 107:12-
13; see also R. 62 (arguing officers conducted a warrantless search, and requesting that 
all discovered contraband be suppressed); R. 63 (arguing that officers conducted an 
illegal search of John Garcia's property and requesting suppression)). 
The defense specified that "the entry itself into the home was unlawful, and [the] 
search even to secure the residence and the incidental search that preceded the search of 
the duffel bag was also unlawful." (R. 107:13-14). 
In response, the prosecutor filed papers and presented argument. The prosecutor 
did not dispute the nature or the scope of defendant's challenge. (R. 64-69; 107:14-15). 
While the prosecutor made allegations in the papers relating to the initial 
warrantless conduct (see R. 65 (alleging that officers secured two males outside the 
premises, opened the duffel bag, and observed marijuana; officers then entered the locked 
apartment)), she presented no evidence on the matter. (See R. 107). Instead, the 
18 
prosecutor argued that the subsequently issued warrant was presumptively valid (R. 
107:14-15), and that the officers' conduct could be upheld under the plain-view and plain-
smell doctrines. (See R. 69 (making reference to "plain smell" and "plain view")). 
A. IN THE TRIAL COURT, THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE 
OR ARGUMENT TO JUSTIFY THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH AT ISSUE. 
THUS, IT FAILED IN ITS BURDEN OF PROOF. 
The defense in this case challenged a warrantless search. (See R. 61-63; 107:12-
14). The prosecutor responded by claiming an issued warrant governed. Also, she 
claimed that the plain-view and plain-smell doctrines preceded the warrant and 
supported the officers' conduct. (See R. 67-69; see also R. 107:14-15). 
In order for the plain-view and plain-smell doctrines to apply here, the state was 
required to prove that when the officers entered the premises before seeking a warrant, 
they did so legally, and they had sufficient experience and training to immediately 
recognize the evidentiary value of the smell or the item in plain view. See Horton v. 
California, 496 U.S. 128, 137 (1990) (stating that for the plain-view doctrine to apply, 
"not only must the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can be 
plainly seen, but he or she must also have lawful right of access to the object itself); 
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738 (1983) (stating that '"plain view1 provides grounds for 
seizure of an item when an officer's access to an object has some prior justification under 
the Fourth Amendment"); State v. South, 885 P.2d 795, 798-99 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(stating that plain smell may support probable cause for a warrant if officers were 
lawfully on the premises), rev'd on other grounds, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996); Gayer, 814 
P.2d at 610 ("The question whether property in plain view of the police may be seized . . . 
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must turn on the legality of the intrusion that enables them to perceive and physically 
seize the property in question55); People v. Cohen, 496 N.E.2d 1231, 1234 (111. Ct. App. 
1986) (stating that evidence must support that officers had "training and experience" 
"sufficient to enable [them] to identify the odor" and contraband). 
If the state waived a hearing on the matter or failed to present evidence to support 
"plain view," it would not meet its burden of proof. See Chandler v. State, 816 N.E.2d 
464, 468 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (stating the government bears the burden of proof under 
the plain-view doctrine; where there was no direct testimony that marijuana was in plain 
view, "we will not presume" plain view). 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408 (Utah 
1984), is instructive. There, defendant was arrested for, and charged with, driving under 
the influence, possession of an open container in a vehicle, and two counts of assault by a 
prisoner. Id. at 410. During pre-trial proceedings, the defendant filed a motion to sup-
press the discovery of an open container in the vehicle, among other things. Id The 
plain-view doctrine was the most likely justification for the seizure. Id. at 411. 
However, the state "elicited no testimony as to when the officers located the container, 
where it was located, and whether it was in open view from a place where the officers 
had a right to be." Id. at 412. Thus, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to 
suppress and the state appealed. Id. at 410-11. 
In considering the matter, the Utah Supreme Court stated the following: 
Although the testimony of the officers at the suppression hearing did not establish 
how or when the officers obtained the container, the record does indicate that the 
officers must have searched the vehicle. Warrantless searches and seizures are per 
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se unreasonable unless exigent circumstances require action before a warrant can 
be obtained. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 69 L.Ed.2d 744 
(1981); Katzv. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); 
State v. Romero, Utah, 660 P.2d 715 (1983); State v. Lee, Utah, 633 P.2d 48 
(1981). Since the officers had no warrant, it was the burden of the State to show 
that the search was lawful. The State presented no evidence establishing the 
lawfulness of the search for, and seizure of, the container. 
Id. at 411 (note omitted). The court held that n[i]n the absence of evidence showing an 
exception to the warrant requirement, we cannot conclude that the trial judge erred in 
suppressing the container." Id. at 412; see also U.S. v. Herrera, 444 F.3d 1238, 
1242 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating the government bears the burden of "demonstrating the 
reasonableness of a warrantless seizure"); U.S. v. Johnson, 936 F.2d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 
1991) (same) (per curiam). 
In this case, the state failed in its burden of proof. Since the challenge in the 
motion to suppress related to the initial warrantless search (see R. 61-63; 107:12-14), it 
was incumbent upon the state to establish that it was lawful. See Christensen, 676 P.2d 
411-12; TeiTV v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) (stating to justify warrantless conduct, 
police "must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the intrusion; the judge must be 
able to assess the "facts available to the officer" engaged in the warrantless conduct); 
McVickers, 838 S.W.2d at 656 (citing Terry, and stating that in a motion to suppress 
hearing, an officer may not testify to the reasons that another officer gave for engaging in 
warrantless conduct). 
Yet, in this case the prosecutor presented no facts to support, and no argument 
regarding, the officers' initial warrantless search of items in the apartment in plain view 
21 
or otherwise. (R. 64-69; 107); see South, 885 P.2d at 798-99 (stating the plain-smell 
doctrine will support probable cause for a warrant if the officer is lawfully present in the 
premises, and can reasonably conclude that contraband may be discovered). Likewise, 
the state on appeal has presented no argument on the matter. (See State's Brief of 
Appellant). 
Given the lack of evidence showing that officers were justified in their initial 
warrantless conduct, this Court "cannot conclude that the trial judge erred in suppressing" 
the evidence. Christensen, 676 P.2d at 412. The warrantless search was unlawful. See 
Kate, 389 U.S. at 357 (stating that warrantless searches are "per se unreasonable" unless 
they comply with one of the "specifically established and well-delineated exceptions"). 
The fmit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine applies. See State v. Deherrera, 965 P.2d 501, 
505 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing that all evidence obtained subsequent to a 
search/seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be suppressed as "fruit of the 
poisonous tree") (citing Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963)); (R. 90-91). 
The trial court's ruling should be affirmed. 
B. ON APPEAL, THE STATE RAISES A NEW ARGUMENT: IT REQUESTS 
APPLICATION OF THE FRANKS DOCTRINE. THE ARGUMENT IS 
MISPLACED. 
In its brief on appeal, the state argues for application of Franks v. Delaware, 438 
U.S. 154 (1978). (See State's Brief of Appellant, 12-13, 15). In Franks, 438 U.S. 154, 
the defendant challenged a search warrant for his apartment. He maintained in a motion 
filed with the court that the warrant lacked probable cause. Id. at 157-58. At the hearing 
on the motion, counsel for Franks "orally amended the challenge to include an attack on 
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the veracity of the warrant affidavit." Id. at 158. The defendant asserted that informants 
identified in the warrant gave information that differed "somewhat " from what was 
recited in the warrant affidavit. Id. The trial court rejected the defendant's challenge and 
rejected his request to call witnesses to testify. Id. at 160. The Delaware Supreme Court 
affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court granted review. Id. at 160-61. It ruled 
that "a challenge to a warrant's veracity must be permitted." Id. at 164. If a challenger 
makes allegations that the warrant affidavit contains a "deliberate falsehood" or a 
"reckless disregard for the truth," and those allegations are accompanied by a sufficient 
offer of proof, the challenger may be entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine if 
infomiation in the warrant must be set aside. I d at 171-72; see also State v. Nielsen, 727 
P .2d l88 , 191 (Utah 1986). 
The state has raised the Franks doctrine here for the first time on appeal. (See 
State's Brief of Appellant, 12-13, 15 (relying on Franks); see also R. 64-69 (making no 
mention of Franks, but rather claiming that the subsequently issued warrant governed; 
also claiming that a portion of the warrant may be upheld under the plain-view and plain-
smell doctrines); R. 107:14-15 (claiming the warrant governed)). It was not preserved in 
proceedings below. 
Indeed, the prosecutor simply argued that if the duffel bag "could not be used as a 
basis for probable cause, the remaining information in the affidavit provides probable 
cause on which to issue a warrant." (R. 68). That was not sufficient to put the trial court 
and the defense on notice that the state was making an argument or an analysis for 
proceedings under Franks. See e.g. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346 (to 
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satisfy preservation, the trial court must be "given an opportunity to address a claimed 
error and, if appropriate, correct it"; also, appellant may not forego a strategy in the trial 
court to raise it on appeal). The prosecutor made no reference to Franks, no reference to 
additional proceedings, and no reference to purportedly false matters in the affidavit for 
the search warrant. (See R. 68-69; 107:14-15). 
Since the Franks doctrine was not preserved, the state must demonstrate plain 
error or exceptional circumstances for review of the issue on appeal. See e.g. Montiel, 
2004 UT App 242, [^10; see also State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993) 
(holding that for plain error, the appellant must show "the following: (i) An error exists; 
(ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful"). 
The state has not claimed or established plain or exceptional error here. (See 
State's Brief of Appellant). Thus, this Court should decline to review the state's Franks 
issue. See U.S. v. Nee, 261 F.3d 79, 86 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that when the government 
failed to raise the issue in the district court, it waived its argument that the subjective 
intent of the officers was irrelevant for establishing probable cause). 
In addition, the state's argument here concerning Franks is irrelevant. John Garcia 
did not challenge the issued warrant and affidavit for containing false statements. (See R. 
61-63). He did not make allegations that the warrant contained deliberate falsehoods or a 
reckless disregard for the truth. (R. 61-63). John Garcia challenged the officers' 
warrantless search of items in the apartment. (R. 61-63). That is a separate matter. See 
supra, Point II.A., herein. This Court should reject the state's argument on appeal. 
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C. THE STATE HAS MADE SEVERAL OTHER REFERENCES TO FOURTH 
AMENDMENT DOCTRINES THAT WERE NOT ARGUED BELOW. THIS 
COURT MAY REJECT THOSE REFERENCES ON APPEAL. 
The state has made reference in its brief to other Fourth Amendment doctrines, 
including the inevitable-discovery rule, the independent-source rule, and the reasonable-
suspicion standard. (See State's Brief of Appellant, 11-14 (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 
U.S. 431 (1984) (applying inevitable-discovery rule); U.S. v. Dessesaure, 429 F.3d 359 
(1st Cir. 2005) (applying independent-source rule); U.S. v. Jenkins, 396 F.3d 751 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (same); U.S. v. Restrepo, 966 F.2d 964, 968-72 (5th Cir. 1992) (same); State 
v. Bilant 36 P.3d 883 (Mont. 2001) (articulating an inquiry that considers attenuation, 
independent source, or inevitable discovery); State v. Beeken, 585 N.W.2d 865, 870 
(Neb. App. 1998) (finding another source for the warrant); State v. Church, 2002 WL 
31840887 (Del. Super. Ct.) (an unpublished trial court ruling considering the reasonable-
suspicion standard))). 
None of those doctrines were raised in the trial court. (See R. 64-69; 107:14-15). 
In addition, the prosecutor did not request further proceedings to establish any theory 
under those doctrines for denying the motion to suppress. (See id.) 
The state has raised inevitable discovery, independent source, and reasonable 
suspicion for the first time on appeal. (See State's Brief of Appellant, 11-14; see also id. 
at 11, 15 (requesting remand for further proceedings)). That is improper. 
The preservation rule applies to the government and bars it from raising new 
issues on appeal under the Fourth Amendment. See Giordenello v. U.S., 357 U.S. 480, 
488 (1958) (rejecting the government's new theory); Nee, 261 F.3d at 86 (stating that the 
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preservation rule "prevents sandbagging"). 
Unless the state can demonstrate plain error or exceptional circumstances, this 
Court should decline to address the state's arguments here. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-
09 (identifying plain-error standard); see also Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, ^|9, 17 
P.3d 1122 (holding that appellant's failure to raise plain error or exceptional 
circumstances in the opening brief may not be cured in the reply brief). 
The state has failed to demonstrate plain error in this case. (See State's Brief of 
Appellant, 11-15). Thus, its arguments should be rejected. See Coleman, 2000 UT 98, 
1[9. In addition, the state's arguments may be rejected where they are inapplicable, as 
further explained. 
1. The Inevitable-Discovery Rule. The inevitable-discovery rule applies as a 
limited exception to the exclusionary rule. It recognizes an illegality in the initial search 
or seizure, and it asks whether evidence seized during the illegal search "ultimately" 
would have been discovered through lawful means. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 
444 (1984); State v. James, 2000 UT 80, f 16, 13 P.3d 576. The doctrine "enables courts 
to look to the facts and circumstances surrounding the discovery of the tainted evidence 
and asks whether the police would have discovered the evidence despite the illegality. 'If 
the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information 
ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means ... then the 
deterrence rationale [of the exclusionary rule]" will not apply, and the evidence will be 
received. State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, [^14, 76 P.3d 1159 (cite omitted). 
The inevitable-discovery rule is inapplicable here for two reasons. First, the state 
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failed to provide any meaningful analysis in its brief for the rule. (See State's Brief of 
Appellant, 11-12). Under the law, adequate briefing '"requires not just bald citation to 
authority[,] but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based upon that 
authority.m State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, p i , 973 P.2d 404 (refusing to consider 
constitutional arguments due to inadequate briefing where appellant merely cited relevant 
constitutional provisions and four cases without meaningful analysis of the authority). It 
requires citations to the record and compliance with the rules. See Peterson v. Sunrider 
Corp., 2002 UT 43, f23 n.9, 48 P.3d 918 (declining to address inadequately briefed claim 
on appeal where it was supported by a vague assertion without citation to the record or 
authority); State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ffl[6 & 7, 1 P.3d 1108 (noting inadequacy of 
appellant's brief where it failed to provide "meaningful legal analysis" and "merely 
contained] one or two sentences stating his argument generally . . . and then broadly 
conclude[d] that [appellant] is entitled to relief); see also Utah R. App. P. 24 (2006) 
(setting forth briefing requirements). 
Here, the state argued against application of the exclusionary rule and it cited to 
Nix. (See State's Brief of Appellant, 11-12). It did not provide reasoned analysis for the 
inevitable-discovery rule or citations to the record to demonstrate its application in this 
case. (Id.) This Court should reject the state's issue for inadequate briefing. See State v. 
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304-05 (Utah 1998) (stating an analysis of "how the facts of [the] 
case satisfy [the legal] requirements was wholly lacking"; also, an issue is inadequately 
briefed "when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of 
research and argument to the reviewing court"); State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 150 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1997) (refusing to consider the state's new Fourth Amendment arguments 
raised first on appeal, where the facts necessary to establish the new arguments were not 
apparent from the record and the arguments were not adequately briefed on appeal). 
Second, there is no basis in the record here for application of the inevitable-
discovery rule. The state presented no evidence to support that officers inevitably would 
have discovered items in the apartment absent the warrantless search. (See R. 107); see 
also Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ^ [14 (recognizing that the prosecution bears the burden of 
proof). In fact, the evidence supported the opposite conclusion. According to the record, 
officers were involved in one continuous flow of events: Officers entered the apartment 
to search items before a warrant was obtained. (See R. 107:11). They discovered 
contraband in a duffel bag in the apartment. (R. 108:14-15). After the discoveries, 
officers contacted Teerlink to prepare an affidavit for a warrant. (See R. 108:16). 
Teerlink prepared the affidavit based on what the officers described to him about the 
warrantless entry and search. (R. 107:9, 10). Teerlink did not indicate any other basis for 
the affidavit; he did not indicate that he either contemplated or was engaged in an 
investigation that inevitably would have resulted in obtaining a warrant for the same 
premises. (SeeR. 107:8-12); see also U.S. v. Thomas, 955 F.2d 207, 211 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that the government failed to prove inevitable discovery, where "the bank 
money found in the illegal search" infected the nature of the investigation that followed); 
U.S. v. Warren, 997 F.Supp. 1188, 1194-95 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (holding that there was no 
evidence that luggage would have been investigated absent the illegal search). 
The inevitable-discovery doctrine is inapplicable to this case. In addition, the state 
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is not entitled to remand for further proceedings to put on evidence under a new theory of 
admissibility raised for the first time on appeal. See Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ^ 1 1 , 22. 
(holding that the state is not entitled to remand to put on new evidence under the 
inevitable-discovery rule). This Court should reject the state's argument. 
2. The Independent-Source Rule. Next, the independent-source rule asks "(1) 
whether 'the agents' decision to seek the warrant was prompted by what they had seen 
during their initial entry,' and (2) whether the affidavit contained sufficient facts to 
support probable cause when the offending facts were excised." Dessesaure, 429 F.3d at 
367 (internal citation and footnote omitted). 
It applies, for example, when there is a basis in the record for seeking the warrant 
that is lawful and separate from the warrantless search. See e.g. U.S. v. Romero, 585 
F.2d 391, 394-95 (9th Cir. 1978) (recognizing that federal agents had information for 
federal warrants prior to state agents engaging in a search that led to suppression); U.S. v. 
Bosby, 675 F.2d 1174, 1180-81 (11th Cir. 1982) (recognizing application of the 
independent-source rule, where the person obtaining the warrant was completely unaware 
of and untainted by the separate, illegal warrantless search). 
The analysis ultimately considers whether "the search pursuant to [a] warrant" was 
prompted in fact by a "genuinely independent source." Murray v. U.S., 487 U.S. 533, 
542 (1988); id. at 542 n.3 (stating that "[t]o determine whether the warrant was 
independent of the illegal entry, one must ask whether it would have been sought even if 
what actually happened had not occurred"). 
Also, the assessment considers the facts of record reflecting the purportedly 
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independent basis for the search warrant. See Dessesaure, 429 F.3d at 361-62, 363, 368-
69 (considering evidence presented at the motion to suppress hearing reflecting that 
officers received information for the warrant "from 'different sources/" and independent 
from the purportedly illegal entry). 
The government carries the burden of proof here. See U.S. v. Leake, 95 F.3d 409, 
417 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating "[t]he government bears the burden of proof in establishing 
the independent source and inevitable discovery doctrines"). 
On appeal in this case, the state has failed to adequately brief application of the 
independent-source rule. (See State's Brief of Appellant, 12-14); see also Jaeger, 1999 
UT 1, 1f31 (stating that adequate briefing requires development of authority and reasoned 
analysis); Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, *|fl[6 & 7 (noting that appellant's brief failed to provide 
"meaningful legal analysis" and "merely contained] one or two sentences stating his 
argument generally . . . and then broadly conclude[d] that [appellant] is entitled to 
relief); Thomas, 961 P.2d at 304-05 (stating that an issue is inadequately briefed "when 
the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argu-
ment to the reviewing court"). It has failed to provide reasoned analysis in the context of 
this case with citations to the record for support. (See State's Brief of Appellant, 12-14); 
see also Montoya, 937 P.2d at 150 (refusing to consider new arguments where the facts 
would not support them, and stating that "[a] well-briefed argument is most essential for 
an issue raised" first on appeal "because the new issue has not been addressed by the 
parties below and thus record support for the unaddressed argument is critical"). 
In addition, there is no basis in the record for applying the independent-source 
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rule. Specifically, after officers in this case engaged in a warrantless search (see supra, 
Point II.A., herein), they contacted Teerlink to prepare an affidavit. (See R. 108:14, 15, 
16). Teerlink relied on information from officers involved in the initial warrantless 
search to fill out the request for the warrant. (See R. 107:9, 10; 108:14, 15, 16). The 
search warrant was prepared because of items found in the apartment. (R. 108:14-15). 
Teerlink had no other basis for preparing a warrant. (See R. 107). He was not involved, 
for example, in a separate surveillance of the apartment; and he did not have a source 
independent from the officers at the scene for his information. Teerlink acknowledged 
that he relied only on "information [he] received from officers" at the scene of the 
warrantless search. (R. 107:10). 
Where the record fails to support application of the independent-source rule, the 
state is not entitled to remand for further proceedings. It may not go back to the trial 
court to present evidence for a new theory of admissibility raised for the first time on 
appeal. See Topanotes, 2003 UT 30,Iffil 1, 22 (holding that the state is not entitled to 
remand to put on evidence under a new theory). This Court should reject the state's 
argument on appeal. 
3. The Reasonable-Suspicion Standard. Finally, the reasonable-suspicion 
standard allows officers to temporarily detain a suspect for purposes of a criminal 
investigation. To justify conduct under that standard, the state must present "specific and 
articulable facts and rational inferences" to support that officers had reasonable suspicion 
to believe that defendant was involved in criminal activity. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 
125, p 5 , 63 P.3d 650 (cites omitted). The detention and resulting investigation must be 
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limited in "length and scope." State v. Johnson. 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991) (quoting 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968)). It must be "'strictly tied to and justified by' the 
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." Johnson, 805 P.2d at 763 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20). 
The inquiry under the reasonable-suspicion standard is fact intensive. See State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1994) (stating that "[rjeasonable-suspicion determinations 
are highly fact dependent, and the fact patterns are quite variable"), abrogated on other 
grounds as recognized in Campbell v. State Farm, 2001 UT 89, 65 P.3d 1134. Also, the 
state bears the burden of proof See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (stating the officer must point 
to specific and articulable facts to support reasonable suspicion). 
On appeal in this case, the state has not specified how the reasonable-suspicion 
standard may apply to salvage the warrantless search in the apartment and/or the search 
warrant. (See State's Brief of Appellant, 14 (asserting without reference to the record 
that there was a "report" of a "robbery," "furtive, evasive behavior," and "two men" who 
"attached great importance" to a duffel bag that they "desperately" attempted to "remove 
from the apartment"; and making reference to an unpublished trial court case from 
Delaware)). It has left the analysis for this Court. That is inadequate. See State v. 
Barrett 2006 UT App 417, %16 n.7, - P.3d --, 2006 WL 2923802 (stating, "we do not 
address" appellant's constitutional claim because "we are not 'simply a depository in 
which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research'") (cite 
omitted); State v. Green, 2004 UT 76,1fl3, 99 P.3d 820 (same); Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ^ 6 
(same); see also supra, pp. 27-28, herein. 
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In addition, the state is not entitled to remand to further explore the matter. See 
Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ffifl 1> 22- T h i s C o u r t should reject the state's reference on 
appeal to the reasonable-suspicion standard. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, during trial court proceedings, the prosecutor made no effort to 
demonstrate application of, or to request a hearing for, the Franks doctrine, the inevitable-
discovery rule or the independent-source rule. Likewise, she made no argument for the 
reasonable-suspicion standard. (R. 64-69; 107:14-15). While the prosecutor argued that 
remaining portions of the affidavit would provide "probable cause on which to issue the 
warrant" (R. 68), the prosecutor did not offer an adequate basis for salvaging the 
warrantless search, and, by extension, any portion of the subsequently issued warrant. 
(See R. 68-69; 107:14-15). The state failed in its burden of proof. See Christensen, 676 
P.2d at 411-412. The trial court properly granted the motion to suppress. (R. 90-91). 
On appeal, the state cannot argue new theories in an effort to salvage the search. 
In addition, it is not entitled to remand for further proceedings. See Topanotes, 2003 UT 
30, TfTfl 1, 22. For the reasons set forth herein, John Garcia respectfully requests that this 
Court affirm the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. 
SUBMITTED this [0 day of \Ng^Q^^V^V r~ , 2006. 
Liij&a M. Jones II 
Steven G. Shapiro 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV 
Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
